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In Chinese literature the locus classicus of what in the West has been called 
“the golden rule” is a passage from the Lunyu 論語 (Analects)1 in which 
Zigong 子貢, one of Confucius’ favourite disciples asks his Master about a 
principle that can guide man’s behaviour:  
Zigong asked: “Is there an adage that can guide us throughout our life?” 
The Master said: “It is shu! What you don’t want done to yourself, do 
not do to others.”2  
                                                 
1  Considered the main source of the Master’s teachings, for more than two thousand 
years, the Analects have been an essential focal point in the philosophical and politi-
cal discourse concerning ancient, modern and contemporary China. Several sections 
were written after Confucius’ death, while about half the text, and in particular the 
last of the twenty books comprising it, date to a later period. It originally circulated 
in a fluid form consisting of scattered heterogeneous collections of conversations, 
aphorisms and anecdotes that, in all likelihood, around the mid 3rd c. B.C., were 
drawn up in several versions of the work. Side by side with the vulgate, the earliest 
exemplary manuscript of the work is the text discovered in 1973 in the tomb of Liu 
Xiu 劉修, Prince Huai 懷 of Zhongshan 中山, who died in the year 55 B.C. at 
Dingzhou 定州 (in Hebei province). A total of 7576 characters of this manuscript 
have been identified – about half the text passed down. On the origin and textual nar-
rative of the Lunyu passed down and of the Dingzhou manuscript, see, for instance, 
D.C. Lau (transl.), Confucius: The Analects (Lun yü) (Hong Kong 1983), pp. 262-
74; Anne Cheng, “Lun yü,” in Michael Loewe (ed.), Early Chinese Texts: A Biblio-
graphical Guide (Berkeley 1993), pp. 313-323; Ernst Bruce Brooks – A. Taeko 
Brooks, The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors (New York 
1998), pp. 1, 201-256; Roger T. Ames – Henry Rosemont (eds.), The Analects of 
Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New York 1998), pp. 7-10; Hebeisheng 
Wenwu yanjiusuo Dingzhou Han mu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 河北省文物研究所定州
漢墓竹簡整理小組, Dingzhou Han mu zhujian Lunyu 定州漢墓竹簡論語 (Beijing 
1997). 
2  子貢問曰: 「有一言而可以終身行之者?」子曰: 「其恕乎!」己所不欲,勿施於
人。」 Lunyu XV, 24. The “golden rule” theme in Chinese tradition has been the 
subject of numerous comprehensive debates over the past few decades. The most im-
portant studies in this regard include: Fung Yu-lan [Feng Youlan], A Short History of 
Chinese Philosophy (New York 1948), pp. 42-44; Herbert Fingarette, “Following 
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In the sentence “What you don’t want done to yourself, do not do to others” 
( ji suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren 己所不欲, 勿施於人) Confucius defined shu 恕, 
a character variably translated as “reciprocity,” “consideration of others” or 
“do unto others as you would have others do unto you.” Shu is one of the 
most widely debated and controversial assertions of Confucian ethics, not 
only because of the alleged analogy with the biblical “golden rule,” but also 
because of its semantic richness, as we discover from reading the Analects 
and other Confucian writings.3 Confucius perceived in shu a basic require-
ment for anyone setting out to lead a virtuous life, in conformity with the 
mores of the sages of ancient times, as inherited and elaborated by Confu-
cius and his followers. 
Shu recurs again in Lunyu IV,15, where it imposes itself with greater 
force and incisiveness, together with another key concept of Confucian eth-
ics, zhong 忠, which contributes to defining the semantic area of both terms. 
This time, it is the Master who leads off with a statement and one of his dis-
ciples, Zengzi 曾子, who offers a plausible interpretation of his laconic 
statements: 
                                                                                                               
the ‘One Thread’ of the Analects,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 47 
(1979), pp. 373-405; Robert E. Allinson, “On the Negative Version of the Golden 
Rule as Formulated by Confucius,” New Asia Academic Bulletin 3 (1982), pp. 305-
315; id., “The Confucian Golden Rule: A Negative Formulation,” Journal of Chi-
nese Philosophy 12 (1985) 3, pp. 305-315; Daniel L. Hall – Roger T. Ames, Think-
ing through Confucius (Albany, NY 1987), pp. 283-304; Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Re-
weaving the ‘One Thread’ of the Analects,” Philosophy East and West 40 (1990) 1, 
pp. 17-30; David S. Nivison, “Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Moral Philoso-
phy,” in id., The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy (Chi-
cago et al. 1996), pp. 59-76; id., “Zhong (Chung) and Shu: Loyalty and Reciproc-
ity,” in Antonio S. Cua (ed.), Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy (New York – 
London 2003), pp. 882-885; Heiner Roetz, Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age. A Re-
construction under the Aspect of Breakthrough toward Postconventional Thinking 
(Albany, NY 1993), pp. 137-148. Wang Qingjie, “The Golden Rule and Interper-
sonal Care – From a Confucian Perspective,” Philosophy East and West 49 (1999) 4, 
pp. 415-438; Sin Yee Chan, “Can Shu Be the One Word that Serves as the Guiding 
Principle of Caring Action?” Philosophy East and West 50 (2000) 4, pp. 507-524; 
Bryan W. Van Norden, “Unweaving the ‘One Thread’ of Analects 4:15,” in id. 
(ed.), Confucius and the Analects: New Essays (Oxford 2002), pp. 216-236; Bo 
Mou, “A Reexamination of the Structure and Content of Confucius’ Version of the 
Golden Rule,” Philosophy East and West 54 (2004) 2, pp. 218-247. 
3  For an excursus of the concept of shu in Hanfeizi 韓非子, Guoyu 國語, Guanzi 管子, 
Zuozhuan 佐傳 and Yanzi chunqiu 晏子春秋, see H. Roetz, Confucian Ethics of the 
Axial Age, pp. 133-148. For an analysis of Lunyu IV,15 see B.W. Van Norden, 
“Unweawing the ‘One Thread’ of Analects 4:15.” 
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The Master said: “Shen! In my Way there is one thread binding all to-
gether.” Zengzi said: “Indeed!” When the Master had left, the disciples 
asked: “What did he mean?” Zengzi [Shen] replied: “The Master’s Way 
consists of zhong and shu and that’s all.”4  
Zengzi, here interpreter of the Master’s teachings, explains shu, which ac-
cording to Confucius means “what you don’t want done to yourself, do not 
do to others,” and zhong as the unique and indispensable path along the 
Way (dao). Shu and zhong are inextricably interwoven, aimed at a virtuous 
and exemplary modus vivendi that only a gentleman ( junzi) is able to achieve. 
Ernst Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks maintain that Lunyu IV,15 is a 
later interpolation, subsequent to the rest of Book IV, one of the oldest in 
the work. Sharing this hypothesis, in a very intriguing article Bryan Van 
Norden, who ascribes Lunyu IV,15 to Zengzi’s followers, has argued that 
the terminus a quo for the interpolation would be Zengzi’s death in 436 BC. 
He does not deny that the claim expressed in the passage, that is that zhong 
and shu constitute the “one thread” that binds together Confucius’ teaching, 
may be true but, according to him, the assertion that zhong and shu were 
two cardinal virtues promoted by Confucius as suggested in Lunyu IV,15 is 
not supported by the rest of the Analects.5 
 
Zhong versus shu 
In order to fully understand Zengzi’s assertion it is advisable to examine the 
semantic variability of shu and zhong in other passages in the Analects by 
comparing them with several occurrences of the two terms in other texts of 
the Confucian tradition. Commenting the practices of zhong and shu, the 
Zhongyong 中庸 (On the practice of the mean), traditionally ascribed to Zisi 
子思, Confucius’ grandson and Zengzi’s disciple, reads: 
One who is zhong and shu will never stray from the Way. What he does 
not wish done to him he does not do unto others. The way of the true 
gentleman involves four things, and I, Qiu (Confucius), have so far been 
incapable of any of them. In serving my father, I have been incapable of 
doing what is expected of a son; in serving my lord, I have been incapa-
ble of doing what is expected of a minister; in serving my older brother, 
I have been incapable of doing what is expected of a younger brother; in 
                                                 
4  子曰:「參乎! 吾道一以貫之。」曾子曰:「唯!」子出, 門人問曰:「何謂也?」 曾
子曰:「夫子之道, 忠恕而已矣。」Lunyu IV,15. 
5  Bruce Brooks and Taeko–Brooks, The Original Analects, pp. 136, 149. Van Norden, 
“Unweaving the ‘One Thread’ of Analects 4:15,” pp. 217, 223-224.  
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reaching out to friends, I have been incapable of doing what is expected 
of a friend.6 
Commenting on Lunyu IV,15, Huang Kan 皇侃 (488–545) interpreted zhong 
as jin zhong xin ye 盡中心也 (to fully focus on one’s heart-and-mind) and 
shu as cun wo yi duo yu ren ye 忖我以度於人也 (to ponder on oneself in 
order to measure the others). According to this interpretation, starting from 
oneself is the only way to analyse and understand the others, and, in the 
words of Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249), zhong is qing zhi jin ye 情之盡也 (to 
fully realize one’s feelings/emotions), while shu is fan qing yi tong wu ye 反
情以同物也 (to reflect on one’s feelings/emotions in order to have sympa-
thy with other beings).7 Xing Bing 邢昺 (931–1010), following Huang Kan, 
explained zhong as jin zhong xin ye 盡中心也 (to fully focus on one’s heart-
and-mind) and shu as cun ji duo wu ye 忖己度物也 (pondering on oneself to 
measure other beings).8  
Moving from the etymology of zhong 忠, which is composed of two 
words, zhong 中 (center) and xin 心 (heart-and-mind), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–
1200) explained its meaning with the locution jinji 盡己 (to fully exert one-
self, to do the utmost), or jiejin 竭盡 (to do one’s best, to exhaust oneself). 
He explained shu 恕, composed of the words ru 如 (to follow) and xin 心 
(heart-and-mind) as tuiji 推己 (to extend oneself), in the sense of to be em-
pathetic towards others.9 He quoted a commentary and then Master Cheng’s 
程 (one of the Cheng brothers) interpretation: 
Someone said: “To focus on the heart-and-mind corresponds to zhong, to 
follow the heart-and-mind corresponds to shu.” This indeed captures the 
meaning. Master Cheng said: “Moving from oneself to approach other 
creatures is ren 仁 (benevolence, humanity). Extending oneself to other 
                                                 
6  忠恕違道不遠, 施諸己而不願, 亦勿施於人。君子之道四, 丘未能一焉: 所求於子
以事父, 未能也; 所求乎臣以事君, 未能也; 所求乎弟以事兄, 未能也; 所求乎朋友
先施之, 未能也。Zhongyong XIII, in Zhu Xi 朱熹, Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集
注 (Beijing 1983), vol. 2, p. 72; transl. Daniel K. Gardner, The Four Books: the Ba-
sic Teachings of the Later Confucian Tradition, Translations with Introduction and 
Commentary (Indianapolis – Cambridge, 2007), p. 117.  
7  Huang Kan 皇侃, Lunyu jijie yishu 論語集解義疏 (Taipei 1968), ch. 4, pp. 31-32; 
see also E. Slingerland, Confucius. Analects. With Selections from Traditional Com-
mentaries (Indianapolis – Cambridge 2003), p. 34.  
8  Lunyu zhushu 論語注疏, in Shisanjing zhushu 十三經注疏 (Taipei 1989), vol. 8, 
chap. 4, p. 4. 
9  Zhu Xi 朱熹, Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 
chap. 2, p. 72.  
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creatures is shu (empathy). This means being ‘not far from the Way’. 
[...] ”10 
As in the Analects, so in the Zhongyong, the two virtues are linked. It is 
worth dwelling first on the assertion zhong shu wei dao bu yuan 忠恕違道
不遠 (One who is zhong and shu will never stray from the Way): this sen-
tence echoes what was declared in Lunyu IV,15, wu dao yi yi guan zhi 吾道
一以貫之 (in my Way there is one thread binding all together), namely, in 
the interpretation by Zengzi, “the Master’s Way consists of zhong and 
shu.”11 It is clear how zhong and shu are two essential conditions regarding 
the conduct of the gentleman and, however humble Confucius is in admit-
ting he has not yet achieved them, he is nevertheless wholly projected to-
wards them in the desire to attain an exemplary conduct.  
But what exactly is meant by zhong, and what implications does it have 
when related to shu? According to Xu Shen 許慎 (ca. 55–149), the author 
of the first systematic dictionary of Chinese characters, Shuowen jiezi 說文
解字, the meaning of zhong 忠 is jing 敬 (respect, reverence) and he adds: 
jin xin wei zhong 盡心為忠 (to give full realization to one’s heart-and-mind 
is what is meant by zhong).12 This amounts to saying that he who is zhong 
shows reverence as he performs his tasks with absolute devotion, dedicating 
the whole of himself. Shu 恕 is instead generically defined by Xu Shen as 
ren 仁 (benevolence, humanity), while Mengzi 孟子 (fourth cent. B.C.) is 
more precise, claiming that it is something close to benevolence, that is a 
virtue that must be strengthened in order to attain benevolence.13 
Whoever wrote Lunyu IV,12 and Zhongyong, XIV – according to tradi-
tion, Zengzi or his followers in one case, Zisi or his followers in the other – 
                                                 
10   或曰:「中心為忠, 如心為恕。」於義亦通。程子曰:「以己及物, 仁也; 推己 及
物, 恕也, 違道不遠是也。[...] 」 Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, p. 72. See also 
Daniel K. Gardner, Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects. Canon, Commentary, and the 
Classical Tradition (New York 2003), pp. 158-159.  
11  Lunyu IV,15. 
12  Duan Yucai 段玉裁, Shuowen jiezi zhu 說文解字注 (Shanghai 1984), chap. 10B, p. 
25b. Jinxin 盡心 (To give full realization to one’s heart-and-mind) is the title of 
Mengzi VIIA,1. The incipit of the chapter reads: 孟子曰:「盡其心者, 知其性, 則
知天矣。」 “For a man to give full realization to his heart-and-mind is for him to 
understand his own nature, and to understand his own nature is to understand 
Heaven.” See also D.C. Lau, Mencius (Hong Kong 1979, repr. 1984), p. 265 and 
Bryan W. Van Norden (transl.), Mengzi. With Selections from Traditional Commen-
taries (Indianapolis – Cambridge 2008), p. 171. 
13  強恕而行, 求仁莫近焉。 “Strengthen your empathy and you will find that this is the 
shortest way to benevolence.” Mengzi VIIA,4. 
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it cannot be denied that these texts emphasize a close and essential relation 
between zhong and shu.  
The primary meaning of zhong is loyalty, a cardinal ethical norm in Chi-
nese political culture during the Chunqiu (770–453 BC) and Zhanguo (453–
221 BC) periods. Officials and ministers were urged to preserve zhong even 
at the expense of their lives, since without loyal ministers the state would 
perish. In an illuminating essay, Yuri Pines has analyzed the implications of 
the concept of zhong in the manuscript texts found in the tomb of a high-
ranking mid-Zhanguo official at the site of Guodian, in Hubei province, in 
particular the bamboo slips that contain miscellaneous sayings known as Yu-
cong 語叢 (Collected Sayings), Lu Mugong wen Zisi 魯穆公問子思 (Duke 
Mu of Lu asks Zisi) and Zhongxin zhi dao 忠信之道 (The Way of loyalty 
and truthfulness). 14 In Zhongxin zhi dao it is stated that zhong, ren zhi shi ye
忠, 仁之實也 (loyalty is the essence of benevolence),15 which denotes the 
centrality of zhong in this text. From the Guodian texts, we may infer a di-
chotomy between blood ties and ruler-minister ties, in which family ties are 
favoured over political obligations. Moreover, the ruler-minister relations, 
as Yuri Pines remarks, are explained in reciprocal, egalitarian terms, rather 
than hierarchical terms. This has shed a new light on our understanding of 
zhong: a minister should be loyal to his ruler in the sense that he will pre-
serve the paramount position of a ruler as the single source of political au-
thority without renouncing his freedom to leave him if his behaviour is im-
proper. In fact, in Yucong 1 we read that jun chen, peng you, qi ze zhe 君臣, 
朋友, 其擇者 (ruler and minister are like friends: they select each other).16 
And in Yucong it is stated that if the ruler and minister are unable to stay to-
gether, their relation can be interrupted: 
A father is not hated. The ruler is like a father: he is not hated. He is like 
a flag for the three armies – he [represents] correctness. Yet, he differs 
from the father: when ruler and minister are unable to stay together, you 
can sever [these relations]; when you dislike [the ruler], you may leave 
                                                 
14  For an exhaustive analysis of the concept of zhong in the political sphere of pre-
imperial China, also in the light of the analysis of recently acquired manuscripts, see 
Yuri Pines, “Friends or Foes. Changing Concepts of Ruler-Minister Relations and 
the Notion of Loyalty in Pre-Imperial China,” Monumenta Serica 50 (2002), pp. 35-
74. 
15  Zhongxin zhi dao, slip 8; Jingmen shi bowuguan bian 荊門市博物館編  (ed.), 
Guodian Chumu zhujian 郭店楚墓竹簡 (Beijing 1998), p. 163; see also Li Ling 李
零, Guodian Chu jian jiao duji 郭店楚簡校讀記 (Beijing 2002), p. 100. 
16  Yucong 1, slip 87; Jingmen shi bowuguan bian, Guodian Chumu zhujian, p. 197; Li 
Ling, Guodian, p. 160; Pines, “Friends or Foes,” p. 41.  
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him; when he acts improperly/unrighteously towards you, you should not 
accept it.17  
Yuri Pines has demonstrated that the concept of loyal minister in the Chun-
qiu times differed from the subsequent concept in the Zhanguo times. In 
Chunqiu times, the minister was to be faithful and obedient to his ruler,  
with an understanding that the minister’s highest goal was to serve the 
“altars of soil and grain” (sheji 社稷), that is the state or the populace in 
general. Thus, when a minister could claim that his actions were in ac-
cord with what he believed to be the state’s interests, he had the right to 
defy the ruler’s orders, and even act against the ruler. This notion of 
loyalty to the altars allowed, as we shall see, considerable freedom of ac-
tion to the ministers – largely at the expense of the rulers.18  
The minister was to be obedient to his ruler, but he was primarily expected 
to pursue state interests. This attitude resulted from the balanced combina-
tion of two virtues from which the compound zhongxin 忠信 derived: zhong, 
loyalty for the sake of the state (represented by the expression “altars of soil 
and grain”), and xin 信, unconditional faithfulness and obedience to the 
ruler. But there were instances in which a good minister could not obey the 
ruler’s orders, that is, when the ruler’s orders were incompatible with the 
state’s interests. In these cases, a good minister was expected to act on be-
half of the state and disobey the ruler, being zhong rather than xin, since the 
interests of the state clashed with the principle of faithfulness and obedience 
to the ruler. Thus loyalty prevailed over fidelity as the state interests pre-
vailed over the ruler’s interest: zhong and xin were complementary when the 
ruler’s and the state’s interests coincided. The concept of loyalty changed if 
applied to a lower social level, that is the shi 士 stratum, whose position 
was not hereditary but contractual. Their life depended on the emoluments 
granted by their superior, therefore their fidelity to and dependence on him 
were practically absolute. Things changed in the fifth and fourth centuries 
BC when the hereditary aristocrats lost their power and position and the 
members of the shi could ascend to the higher echelons of the government 
apparatus. Therefore the shi formulated a new concept of loyalty congenial 
to their new condition: it was no longer loyalty to the state (or altars of soil 
and grain) nor was it absolute fidelity to their superiors; rather, it was a 
more abstract concept of loyalty in the name of an ethical principle named 
                                                 
17  父亡惡, 君猶父也, 其弗惡也; 猶三軍之〔旗〕也, 正也。所以異於父; 君臣不相 
在也, 則可己; 不悅, 可去也; 不義而加諸己, 弗受也。Yucong 3, slips 1-5; Pines, 
“Friends or Foes,” p. 41. 
18  Pines, “Friends or Foes,” p. 44. 
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dao. The shi par excellence, Confucius, proposed the following definition of 
“great minister”: 
What is called a great minister is one who serves the ruler according to 
the dao, and when he is unable to do so, he stops [serving him].19  
In other words, Confucius and his followers adopted the Chunqiu notion of 
loyalty to the ruler provided that he was a good ruler. They set a normative 
ideal of behaviour, the dao, which was supposed to be followed both by the 
ruler and by a good minister. In this way, they established a new order in 
which the dao, which was understood and interpreted by them, was identi-
fied with the universal principle – it replaced the Chunqiu “altars of soil and 
grain” – which governed human relations. Therefore the relation between 
ruler and minister was the following: the minister owed loyalty to his ruler 
and the ruler was supposed to treat his minister with propriety, according to 
the li 禮.20  
A shi wanted to be acknowledged and respected by his ruler, and only 
then did he show him profound loyalty. “A shi would die for the sake of the 
one who profoundly understands him” (shi wei zhi ji zhe si 士為知己者死), 
we read in Zhanguo ce 戰國策:21 from this statement it becomes clear that 
what the shi demanded was reciprocity in ruler-minister relations. This con-
cept is expressed also in Lunyu II,20, which reads: 
Ji Kangzi22 asked: “To make the people be respectful, loyal and zealous, 
what should one do?” The Master said: “Regard them with dignity, and 
they will be respectful. Be filial to your elders and caring to your juniors, 
and they will be loyal. Raise the good and instruct those who are unable, 
and they will be zealous.”23 
Thus, it was the notion of reciprocity, in the name of the dao, that linked 
the two notions of zhong and shu in the Analects. Zhong was not unilateral 
but, like shu, it implied reciprocity. 
                                                 
19  所謂大臣者以道事君不可則止。Lunyu XI,24. 
20  君使臣以禮，臣事君以忠 (A ruler should employ a minister according to ritual, the 
minister should serve the ruler with loyalty). Lunyu III,19. Pines, “Friends or Foes,” 
pp. 53-58. 
21  He Jianzhang 何建章, Zhangguo ce zhushi 戰國策注釋 (Beijing 1991), “Zhao ce” 
趙策 1, 18,4:617. Pines, “Friends or Foes,” p. 58. 
22  The head of the three most influential families of Lu, who were de facto rulers of 
Lu. He died in 469 BC.  
23  季康子問:「使民敬, 忠以勤, 如之何？」子曰:「臨之以莊, 則敬; 孝慈, 則忠; 舉
善而教不能, 則勤。」 
EMPATHY (SHU) IN THE ANALECTS 
 
81
More recently, Paul R. Goldin has observed that the term zhong in many 
Eastern Zhou contexts and throughout the imperial period indeed means 
“loyalty,” but in other contexts it has different meanings. In early Confu-
cian ethics zhong should not be rendered as “loyalty” but as “conscious-
ness” or “being honest with oneself in dealing with others.” He argues that 
the rendering of zhong as “doing one’s best” seems to be inspired by the 
medieval notion of zhong as jinji 盡己, which he renders as “making the 
most of himself,” therefore he concludes: “Following such Neo-Confucian 
usage is anachronistic, to say the least, especially since zhong appears in 
early Confucian (and even pre-Confucian) discourse long before the emer-
gence of the dispute over human nature.”24 In my opinion, the translation of 
zhong as loyalty, intended not as unconditional faithfulness but as honesty to 
oneself and to the others, a condition the individual achieves by focusing on 
his heart-and-mind and doing his utmost (as explained before), is not in con-
tradiction with the reading proposed by Goldin. Moreover, both readings 
require what Goldin calls “to be vigilantly self-aware,” thus imply doing 
one’s best. Zhong is loyalty and absolute dedication which transcends all in-
dividualism, the purely personal, in the attempt to achieve completeness, 
moral integrity and sincerity to oneself and to the others. It is, as Yuri Pines 
put it, loyalty in the name of an ethical principle, the dao. 
In the light of its explicit association with zhong (in Lunyu and in 
Zhongyong), shu was interpreted as the negative formula of the “Confucian 
golden rule,” while zhong, symmetrical with and complementary to it, was 
equated with the positive formula. In reaching this conclusion, Feng Youlan 
remarks how in the Zhongyong shu corresponds precisely to what Confucius 
defined in Lunyu XV,24 with the classical negative formula; indeed, the 
mention of zhong and shu in Zhongyong is followed by a paraphrase of the 
negative formula of the golden rule, and shortly after, the implicit precept is 
“behave towards the others (father, king, elder brother, friend) as befits 
your role.” And it is in the latter assertion, corresponding, according to 
Feng Youlan, to the concept of zhong, that he perceives the golden rule in 
its positive formula.25 In other words, zhong refers to the actions performed 
towards the others precisely as one would have them performed towards 
himself, while shu refers to the actions not performed towards the others 
precisely as one would not have them performed towards himself. Shu is ar-
duous to achieve. In fact, when the disciple Zigong expressed to his Master 
the intention of not doing to the others what he did not want for himself 
Confucius admonished him: “Zigong, you have not yet reached this 
                                                 
24  Paul R. Goldin, “When Zhong 忠 does not mean loyalty,” Dao 2008/7, p. 170. 
25  Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 43-44. 
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point!”26 Thus, zhong and shu are two aspects of one and the same principle 
woven together to produce a “unifying thread” running along the Way indi-
cated by the Master. This interesting, albeit controversial, interpretation is 
open to further reflections on the meaning of the two terms: the existence of 
a complementary relation between them cannot be denied as it is already 
foreshadowed in Lunyu IV,15, although the rich underlying implications are 
much more comprehensive and complex than the simple articulation in posi-
tive (zhong) or negative terms (shu) of the same precept. Moreover, if 
zhong were simply the positive formula and shu the negative formula, it 
would be logical to assume that, since no logical difference exists between 
the two terms, in some contexts one should exclude the other. In fact, Feng 
Youlan founds his thesis on two passages from the Analects in which the 
golden rule is set out in negative and positive terms, although in the same 
passages no mention is made of shu or zhong. The first passage reads as fol-
lows: 
Zhonggong asked about ren. The Master said: “When you are in public 
behave as though you were receiving an important guest. When employ-
ing the common people behave as if you were conducting a great sacri-
fice. What you do not want for yourself, do not do to others. In this way 
you will not encounter resentment in your public or private life.27 
Here, the golden rule is not summed up in the character shu, but rather ex-
pressed explicitly in the formula: ji suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren 己所不欲, 勿施
於人 (What you do not want for yourself, do not do to others), a precept 
that, moreover, is defined in the same passage as an essential component of 
human benevolence (ren). 
The second passage of the Analects mentioned by Feng Youlan is the fol-
lowing: 
Zigong asked: “What about him who is broadly generous with the people 
and is able to help the multitudes? Can we define this ren?” The Master 
said: “Why stop at ren? Such a person should surely be called a Sage! 
Even Yao and Shu would find such a task arduous! The term ren means 
that when you desire to get established yourself, you help others to get 
established; and when you desire success for yourself you help others to 
                                                 
26  子貢曰:「我不欲人之加諸我也,吾亦欲無加諸人。」子曰:「賜也, 非爾所及 
也。」Lunyu V,12. 
27  仲弓問仁。子曰:「出門如見大賓,使民如承大祭。己所不欲,勿施於人。在邦無
怨,在家無怨。」仲弓曰:「雍雖不敏,請事斯語矣。」Lunyu XII,2. 
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succeed. The ability to take as analogy what is near at hand can simply 
be called the method of attaining ren.”28  
Also in this passage, the positive formula, as expressed in the sentence neng 
jin qu pi 能近取譬 (the ability to take as analogy what is near at hand) is not 
explicitly equated with the term zhong.  
I shall shortly come back to the two passages cited. For the time being, I 
shall merely point out that zhong or shu are not mentioned in them.  
Indeed, the two virtues are specific to a morally irreprehensible conduct 
as far as family and social relations are concerned, but what distinguishes 
them is not only the type of action they imply, but above all the recipient of 
this action. Returning to the passage from the Zhongyong mentioned above, 
while in the first assertion, which can presumably be equated with the nega-
tive formula of the golden rule, “What he does not wish done to him he 
does not do unto others” (shi zhu ji er bu yuan, yi wu shi yu ren 施諸己而不
願, 亦勿施於人), no explicit reference is made to family or social relations, 
in the second one four fundamental types of relation are explicitly men-
tioned: between son and father, subject and king, younger brother and elder 
brother and lastly between friends. The behavioural model described, both 
in a family setting (son-father, younger-elder brother) and at the social level 
(subject-king, friend-friend) is the one specific to him who occupies a 
lower, subordinate, position. Clearly, the precept illustrated here is: “Be-
have towards your superiors as you would have your subordinates act to-
wards you,” which seems to extend and complement the definition of zhong 
given in Lunyu II,20: xiao ci, ze zhong 孝慈, 則忠 “Be filial to your elders 
and caring to your juniors and they will be loyal.”29 
From this passage it is clear that zhong is the utmost loyalty the ruler 
will get if he manifests filial love to his elders and care to his subordinates. 
The importance of family and social relations in defining the golden rule 
is further emphasized by a passage from the Daxue 大學 (The Great Learn-
ing), a text traditionally ascribed to Master Zeng: 
                                                 
28  子貢曰: 「如有博施於民而能濟眾, 如何？可謂仁乎?」 子曰: 「何事於仁! 必也 
聖乎! 堯, 舜其猶病諸! 夫仁者, 己欲立而立人, 己欲達而達人。能近取譬, 可謂 
仁之方已。」 Lunyu VI,30.  
29  This is the theory proposed by David Nivison, who states that zhong and shu are hi-
erarchic opposites. Shu normally has a downward direction whereas zhong “bids me 
to be strict with myself in dealing with another in an equal or higher position, disre-
garding my own feelings about myself if I must, and holding myself to at least the 
same high standard of behavior toward the other that I would expect him to observe 
toward me if our positions were reversed.” Nivison, “Zhong (Chung) and Shu: Loy-
alty and Reciprocity,” p. 884. 
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What you dislike in your superior, do not use in employing your inferior; 
what you dislike in your inferior, do not use in serving your superior; 
what you dislike in the one who precedes you, do not use in dealing with 
the one who comes after you; what you dislike in the one who comes af-
ter you, do not use in dealing with the one who precedes you. This is 
what is called the method of the “measuring square.”30 
Xieju 絜矩 (measuring-square), is the rule governing human relations.31 Zhu 
Xi glosses xie 絜 as du 度 (to measure) and ju 矩 as suoyi wei fang 所以為
方 (an instrument for squaring). Elsewhere he explains the concept in these 
terms:  
What is called “measuring square” is [the carpenter’s] square, that is the 
heart-and-mind. What my heart-and-mind wishes corresponds to what 
others wish. If I wish to show filial and brotherly love and be caring to 
the young, I will wish others, like me, show filial and brotherly love and 
be caring to the young [...]  
Therefore the gentleman perceives that the heart-and-mind of others and 
his own are similar. Hence he always uses his own heart-and-mind to 
measure the heart-and-mind of others, so that all will become tranquil.32 
A gentleman perceives that the heart-and-mind of others and his own are 
similar, therefore he considers and understands the feelings and wishes of 
others starting from his own. 
Zhu Xi further comments that “shu also corresponds to the meaning of 
xieju” (shu yi shi xieju zhi yi 恕, 亦是契矩之意), an equation which he in-
fers from the last sentence of the Daxue passage which he comments as fol-
lows:  
                                                 
30  所惡於上, 毋以使下; 所惡於下, 毋以事上; 所惡於前, 毋以先後; 所惡於後, 毋以
從前; 所惡於右, 毋以交於左; 所惡於左, 毋以交於右: 此之謂絜矩之道。 Daxue, 
in Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, chap. 10, p. 10; transl. D.S. Nivison, “Golden Rule 
Arguments,” p. 64 (modified), see also Andrew Plaks (transl.), Ta Hsüeh and Chung 
Yung (The Highest Order of Cultivation and On the Practice of the Mean) (London 
2003), pp. 15-16. 
31  Andrew Plaks remarks that the first word in the compound expression xieju is an ob-
scure verb meaning “to tie,” possibly a graphic substitute for a near homophone 
meaning “to grip.” The compound is generally understood in the sense of measuring, 
in the sense of “taking the moral measure” of one’s proper role in the ordering of the 
world. Plaks, Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung, p. 109. 
32  所谓絜矩者, 矩者, 心也, 我心之所欲, 即他人之所欲也。我欲孝弟而慈, 必欲 他
人 皆如我之孝弟而慈。[...] 是以君子见人之心与己之心同, 故必以己度人之 心, 
使 皆得其平。” Li Jingde 黎靖德, Zhuzi yulei 朱子語纇 (Beijing 1985), ch. 16, p. 
361. 
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If you do not wish your superiors not to observe ritual propriety toward 
you, considering this you must measure the heart-and-mind of your sub-
ordinates and dare not treat them without observing ritual propriety. If 
you do not wish your subordinates to be disloyal toward you, considering 
this you must measure the heart-and-mind of your superiors and dare not 
serve your superiors with disloyalty.33  
In this case, the Daxue defines the behavioural model governing the rela-
tions between men of different social rank by the term xieju, “measuring 
square,” namely, to take oneself as the model for understanding and assess-
ing the feelings of others, and consequently regulating one’s conduct to-
wards them. Proper conduct towards an inferior is implemented by means of 
the li 禮, the traditional ritual norms of kindness, courtesy and good man-
ners required to win the confidence of the people, while zhong, as we have 
said before, is “to serve with loyalty one’s superiors.”  
Unlike the passage cited in Zhongyong, where the behavioural model de-
scribed is that of someone in a subordinate position vis-à-vis a superior, the 
Daxue takes both situations into consideration, that of the subordinate to-
wards the superior and vice versa, at the same time respecting their respec-
tive roles. The “measuring square” applies in all the situations, even though 
a hierarchic relation is postulated. One passage from the Lunyu definitely 
supports this interpretation: 
Duke Ding asked: “How should a ruler employ his ministers, and how 
should ministers serve their ruler?” Confucius replied: “A ruler should 
employ his ministers by observing ritual propriety (li) and ministers 
should serve their ruler by their loyalty (zhong).”34 
As for the ruler, as Confucius emphasizes, it is through the respect of tradi-
tional rules of social conduct, that is, by expressing magnanimity, respect 
and courtesy to his subjects, that he can exercise a virtuous rule, relying on 
moral virtue rather than on the coercive power of laws and punishment. In 
                                                 
33  如不欲上之無禮於我, 則必以此度下之心, 而亦不敢以此無禮使之。不欲下之不 
忠於我, 則必以此度上之心, 而亦不敢以此不忠事之。Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, 
ch. 10, p. 10.  
34  定公問:「君使臣, 臣事君, 如之何? 」孔子對曰:「君使臣以禮, 臣事君 以忠。」 
Lunyu III,19. Another definition of zhong as the loyal and faithful conduct of a 
minister towards his king is found in Lunyu V,19: 子張問曰:「令尹子文三任為 令
尹, 無喜色; 三已之, 無慍色。舊令尹之政, 必以告 新令尹。何如? 」子曰: 「忠
矣。」 [...] Zichang asked: “The Prime Minister Ziwen was three times appointed 
prime minister, and showed no sign of delight. He was three times dismissed and 
showed no sign of resentment. As outgoing prime minister, he always informed the 
incoming prime minister on the affairs of state of his office. What do you think of 
him? The Master said: ‘He doubtless acted with loyalty.’”  
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these conditions, he is able to give orders to his ministers, who consequently 
will relate to him with the greatest loyalty and absolute dedication.  
Zhong is, above all, that condition of loyalty that inextricably binds the 
individual to his superior when the latter exercises his power above all in 
compliance with the ritual norms. In the Lunyu, loyalty (zhong), respect 
( jing 敬) and zeal/diligence (qin 勤) are described as the virtuous modes of 
people’s behaviour.35 Man must therefore nurture filial love (xiao 孝) to-
wards his elders and parental love towards his children (ci 慈): only then 
will the maximum loyalty and absolute devotion be obtained from his subor-
dinates. This is what is prescribed by the traditional ritual rules, the li: 
kindness and respect are an integral part of the traditional rules of conduct 
inherited from the ancient sages and, in the case of the ruler, an essential 
prerequisite for assuring the loyalty and absolute devotion of the people. In 
this sense, li and zhong – one referring to the ruler and the other to the peo-
ple – are complementary in a relation similar to that linking shu and zhong. 
In the assertion “What you do not want for yourself, do not do to others” 
– which for Confucius amounts to shu – what is expressed by “do” is shi 施, 
a character usually used to indicate actions performed towards one’s subor-
dinates or one’s peers. Furthermore, the fact that the golden rule expressed 
by shu refers mainly to the individual occupying a higher-ranking position 
toward an inferior is inferred from the above-mentioned Lunyu XII, 2, 
where it is stated that: “When employing the common people behave as if 
you were officiating a great sacrifice. What you do not want for yourself, 
do not do to others.” In this passage, those on the receiving end of the ac-
tions are the people, who must not be treated roughly or severely but, on the 
contrary, politely and with dignity, in accordance with the ritual norms – 
whence Zhu Xi’s interpretation “If you do not wish your superiors to not 
observe ritual propriety towards you.” It is precisely the respect of the ritual 
norms that safeguards the respective roles in a family and that guarantees 
the maintenance of social order.36 Thus, in order to be accepted, the ruler 
                                                 
35  Lunyu II,20. 
36  These considerations led David S. Nivison to formulate another interpretation of the 
Confucian golden rule: zhong, which he interprets as “doing one’s best,” “commit-
ting the whole of oneself,” “considering oneself responsible for one’s actions” and 
shu, consideration for others, are concretely conceived of in terms of family, social 
and political relations. Shu is always addressed to those who occupy a subordinate 
position, while zhong is the attitude of loyalty towards one’s superiors or, at most, 
towards one’s peers (in connection with this, Kant asserted that Confucius was un-
aware of a genuine morality and that the teachings contained in his works were sim-
ply a moral doctrine for rulers). Therefore Nivison concludes that they are universal 
laws, albeit somewhat attenuated: shu is a directive intended to amend or suspend the 
rules (on the strength of one’s own perception and experience) and is therefore asso-
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should respect his public function which consists of safeguarding peace and 
welfare. As Roetz remarks: “Political rule is measured by the standard of a 
just give and take. [...] Applied to politics, the golden rule may have a 
moderating and humanizing effect. It helps to remind the powerful that the 
ruled are human beings with feelings and expectations like themselves, and 
should be treated as such.”37 
 
The Hypothesis of Herbert Fingarette: 
The Analogy with the Christian Golden Rule 
Before going on to examine the important function of the li in the dialectical 
relation between zhong and shu, it is worth dwelling for a moment on the 
hermeneutics of those passages from the Analects that traditionally define 
the Confucian golden rule. 
One interesting and appealing interpretation of the relation between the 
two concepts was proposed by Herbert Fingarette, who remarked on the 
analogy between the “Confucian golden rule” and Jesus’ words according to 
Matthew 22:35-4 (repeated in Luke 10:25-27 and Mark 12:28-31): 
“Master, which is the greatest commandment in the law?” Jesus an-
swers: “‘Love thy Lord your God, with all your soul, and with all your 
mind.’ That is the greatest commandment. It comes first. The second is 
like it: ‘Love your neighbour as yourself.’ Everything in the Law and the 
prophets hangs on these two commandments.” 
According to Fingarette, zhong essentially corresponds to what is stated in 
the first commandment, while shu proposes the content of the second, 
“Love your neighbour as yourself.” Such an assertion does not imply that 
the amount of love felt for the other, who is near you, is equal to that felt 
for yourself, nor indeed that this love must be quantitatively similar. Rather, 
the object of the love ought just to be one: yourself, namely your neighbour, 
which presupposes that you are “putting yourself in the other’s shoes.”  
Shu is intended to cause me to have concern for you, not to impose my 
tastes and inclinations on you. Therefore, to assess the situation appro-
priately in deciding what I would want, I must not only imagine being in 
your place, I must do this in such a way as to see it through your eyes. 
                                                                                                               
ciated with ritual norms, flexible human rules, as opposed to laws ( fa), that are uni-
versal and inflexible. Zhong, on the other hand, is a rule that governs and regulates 
behaviour towards a superior, an actual rule for inner cultivation. Nivison, “Golden 
Rule Arguments,” pp. 64-67. See also id., “Zhong (Chung) and Shu: Loyalty and 
Reciprocity,” pp. 882-885. 
37  Roetz, Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age, p. 139 
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To put it in a nutshell I must not imagine myself being in your situation; I 
must imagine being you.38 
In such circumstances those who successfully “put themselves in others’ 
shoes” can understand the situation in which the other finds himself and can 
consequently act. This postulate is clearly expressed in the Lunyu VI,30 
where the phrase neng jin qu pi 能近取譬 (the ability to take as analogy 
what is near at hand) means, as Fingarette explains, “to be able from what 
is close, i.e., oneself, to grasp analogy with the other person, and in that 
light to treat him as you would be treated,” or, in other words, “I must 
analogize to the other, imagine being in the other person’s place; then, in 
that status, I am to ask myself what I want or do not want done.”39 This 
concept refers to a similar process and presupposes a mental exercise: in the 
instant in which I succeed in imagining myself “in your shoes” and become 
one with you – what Zhu Xi renders as tui ji zhi ji ren 推己之及人 (extend-
ing oneself to the others) – not only can I see things as you see them, think 
like you, perceive like you and appreciate things like you, but, at the same 
time, I could follow in my imagination everything as if it were my own per-
sonal situation, my own experience, my own life. Of course, I am only 
imagining that I am someone else and might do so incorrectly, incompletely. 
And the greater the effort I make to put myself in your place, the more this 
condition belongs to me and becomes an essential part of my inner life while 
my life view is affected by it, and conforms to it. Shu acts not through coer-
cive means but by virtue of my willingness to adapt; it acts on me, tout 
court, and not just by changing some of my convictions. Once I have at-
tained this condition I am able not only to express a desire but also to for-
mulate a judgment as, even imagining with a part of myself to be in your 
place, to be you, with the other I am judging myself in such a position. 
In this sense, shu is a moral principle that transcends personal desires 
and inclinations, similar to zhong. It implies that I am not expressing a de-
sire but would like to judge what is right and appropriate. If this were not 
the case, I would be authorized to express and fulfil my desires and expecta-
tions, which might be wicked and corrupt. Shu is not only an invitation to 
grasp the analogy and support the desires of others, but is also an encour-
agement to express a judgment and to act correctly, for the purpose of doing 
good.40 This, according to Fingarette, is the context in which we should con-
                                                 
38  Fingarette, “Following the ‘One Thread’ of the Analects,” pp. 382-383. Fingarette’s 
interpretation was probably influenced by the reading of zhong and shu suggested by 
Zhu Xi, who interpreted zhong as the way of Heaven and shu as the way of man. 
39  H. Fingarette, “Following the ‘One Thread’ of the Analects,” p. 383.  
40  Analogous considerations led Heiner Roetz to suggest the translation of “fairness” 
for shu, in the sense of renunciation of prerogatives for oneself, and the granting of 
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sider zhong, which comes into play to fill the semantic and conceptual gap 
left by shu: zhong is loyalty and absolute dedication which transcends all in-
dividualism, the purely personal, and is a spur to achieving completeness 
and authenticity, that is moral integrity, which designates a psychological 
effort to be sincere, authentic to oneself and to others. 
Fingarette claims that, just as in the teachings of Jesus, the golden rule is 
made up of two essential components – the love of God and the love of 
one’s neighbour – in similar fashion, in the teaching of Confucius “the uni-
fying principle” is made up of zhong, loyalty, absolute dedication to a tran-
scendent principle (the dao, as in the analysis of Yuri Pines) and shu, love 
of one’s fellow man. The basic difference between the Confucian precept 
and the biblical one lies in the identity of the transcendent principle.41  
Zhong, as we have seen, primarily expresses the concept of absolute loy-
alty, devotion: it is loyalty defined not as blind obedience to a superior or 
one’s peer but as an absolute commitment to preserving the integrity of 
one’s existence, of safeguarding one’s social role. The individual practises 
this virtue in accordance with the ritual norms, that is, by displaying defer-
ence and willingness but also by resisting and remonstrating when the other 
                                                                                                               
everything one thinks appropriate for oneself to the other. Roetz, Confucian Ethics of 
the Axial Age, p. 134. 
41  Fingarette, “Following the ‘One Thread’ of the Analects,” p. 388; Nivison (“Zhong 
[Chung] and Shu: Loyalty and Reciprocity,” p. 883; “Golden Rule Arguments,” pp. 
72-73), while appreciating H. Fingarette’s interpretation, points out several contra-
dictions in it. Fingarette interprets zhong as “loyalty-fidelity” (zhong–xin) which he 
considers to refer to moral rules, to principles of justice dictated by Heaven (which 
he associates with God); in fact, loyalty and fidelity are primarily displayed towards 
men, not toward principles. Moreover, Fingarette emphasizes the role of zhong and 
shu as criteria for judging what is just. This interpretation, suggested by the passage 
in the Daxue defining the Confucian golden rule in terms of “measuring square,” 
was developed in the 18th c. by the philosopher Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777), who 
claimed that the ethical sense belongs to the sage and coincides with his desires. 
Therefore, genuine moral principles are precisely those that appear such to us. In this 
sense, the sage is guided by a kind of moral intuition, a theory formulated by Dai 
Zhen on the basis of the conception of the original goodness of the human nature of 
Mengzi. Mengzi ziyi shuzheng 孟子字義疏證 (An Explication of the Meaning of 
Terms in the Mengzi), Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書 (Shanghai 2002), chap. 1, 
pp. 21-22; P. Ivanhoe (“Reweaving the ‘one thread’ of the Analects,” p. 21) ob-
serves that, although Fingarette’s analysis reveals important features of the thinking 
we find in Lunyu, it is based on a misunderstanding of the concept of zhong which, 
associated with xin, would mean something like “interpersonal good faith and loy-
alty, mediated by the li ‘rituals’.” Instead, according to Ivanhoe, zhong in the Lunyu 
means “doing one’s duty in service to others.”  
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does not behave correctly.42 In this way he guarantees a status, a dignity, a 
role within the community for the superior or for his fellow man.  
The Song Confucians, in their attempt to explain the relation between 
shu and zhong in Lunyu VI,30, interpreted zhong as a principle inherent in 
the heavenly sphere, while shu as a principle inherent in the human sphere, 
thereby endeavouring to emphasize the predominance of zhong over shu. 
Zhu Xi, quoting Master Cheng, thus interpreted Lunyu IV,15: 
Zhong and shu are pervaded by a single unifying principle. Zhong is the 
Way of Heaven, shu is the Way of man. Zhong means absence of hypoc-
risy, shu is how to put zhong into practice. Zhong is substance, shu is 
function. These are the great root and the realized Way.43 
In this way, they enhanced the value of zhong as an immanent principle and 
its fundamental role in producing shu, the Way of man. On the basis of the 
interpretation given by Zhu Xi and the Song era Confucians, Fingarette reit-
erates the primary value of zhong in the Confucian golden rule: zhong, 
which represents the Way of Heaven, transcends the purely personal per-
spective, the here and now and desires, feelings, attitudes and personal in-
clinations and completes shu, which presupposes the existence of a relation 
of mutual understanding and love among men. 
In this interpretation, what characterizes the “Confucian golden rule,” as 
expressed in the dialectical relation between the two terms, is essentially the 
immanent principle.  
In actual fact, in Confucius’ teachings there is an almost total absence of 
any transcendent reality towards which good actions and charitable works 
tend. The main divine entity of the Analects is Heaven (tian 天), which is 
mentioned only twice in the work – a supernatural entity which promulgates 
its own decree (tianming 天命). Confucius declares he came to understand 
its meaning at the age of fifty, but man generally is afraid of it.44 With the 
exception of these laconic statements, the Master does not specifically 
elaborate on the supernatural,45 focusing greater attention on man and his 
                                                 
42  The Master urges one to remonstrate against one’s superiors if necessary and to give 
good advice to one’s fellow men: 事父母諫,見志不從,又敬不違,勞而不怨 “In serv-
ing your father and mother, a faint protest is allowed, but if you realize that your ad-
vice is not accepted, continue to be respectful and do not contradict them. Even if 
this hurts you, do not hold this against them” (Lunyu IV,18).  
43  忠恕一以貫之: 「忠者天道, 恕者人道; 忠者無妄, 恕者所以行乎忠也。忠者體, 
恕者用, 大本達道也。Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, pp. 72-73. See also Nivison, 
“Golden Rule Arguments,” p. 69. 
44  Lunyu II,4; Lunyu XVI,8. 
45  Lunyu VII,21. 
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role in the community.46 The Master did not reject the existence of the su-
pernatural but toned it down by indicating the exclusive Way to elevate 
man, namely self-cultivation and the commitment extended to one’s fellow 
man.  
Assuming that zhong, in harmony with the Way of Heaven, implies full 
self-realization, the attainment of the right way in one’s relations with oth-
ers, Zhu Xi interpreted shu as functional to zhong: a virtue requiring an in-
ner discipline, self-cultivation.  
As we have said before, Confucius interpreted dao as the Way of Man, 
not of Heaven. Even when he aims at perfection, becoming a true gentleman 
( junzi) or even pursuing the privileged condition of the Sage (shengren), 
man is never the object of worship or devotion: nevertheless, he performs 
with an intimate religious attitude the ritual acts he has inherited from the 
past. 
It is necessary to be loyal to those occupying a position that is superior to 
or on a par with your own, sincere with your friends, and scrupulous in ob-
serving the ritual norms handed down from ancient times.47 The ultimate re-
ality towards which each virtuous act tends is identified with the dao. The 
authenticity and moral integrity (cheng 誠) mentioned in the Zhongyong in 
the final analysis reside in the dao of man, the Way indicated by the ancient 
Sages, the Way that runs like a thread through everything, uniting it, the 
mainstays of which are “to act with the maximum loyalty” and “not to im-
pose on others what you do not want for yourself.” As emphasized by the 
Master, loyalty and fidelity are virtues displayed towards one’s peers or su-
periors. By exercising shu, man measures himself with his neighbour, he 
draws from himself analogies and tries to be empathetic to him: this is to 
take the path of benevolence.48 Shu is that attitude that accompanies man 
throughout his life.49 I agree with Nivison when he asserts that: 
                                                 
46  When his disciple Fan Chi 樊遲 questions him on the subject of wisdom, he replies: 
“To devote yourself to what is righteous for the people, to show respect for the gods 
and spirits while keeping them at a distance, can be called wisdom” 務民之義, 敬鬼
神而遠之, 可謂知。Lunyu VI,22.  
47  吾日三省吾身:「為人謀而不忠乎? 與朋友交而不信乎? 傳不習乎? “Every day I 
examine myself on three questions: In planning for the other was I disloyal? In rela-
tions with my friends was I untruthful? Have I not practised what was handed down 
to me?” Lunyu I,4. 
48  Lunyu VI,30. Zhu Xi comments: 近取諸身, 以己所欲譬之於他人, 知其所欲亦猶 
是也。然後推其所欲以及於人, 則恕之事而仁之術也。“Near at hand to draw 
from oneself is to take what one desires oneself and analogize it to others, under-
standing that what they desire is just the same. Afterwards, one approaches others 
extending to them what he desires, which is a matter of empathy and the way to be-
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[...] it is not really a “rule” at all, but a maxim to guide one in shaping 
and cultivating a character of ideal human kindness in oneself. That is, it 
describes a virtue in persons rather than a quality of correctness in acts.50 
It is therefore shu that essentially expresses the principle of the “Confucian 
golden rule,” while zhong contributes to defining the terms thereof when it 
is transferred onto the social sphere.  
Shu is a virtue that must constantly be cultivated, while zhong completes 
its meaning, leading man to transfer his natural feelings and attitudes to the 
community level, pouring his whole self into the relation that identifies him 
as socially subordinate or similar.  
In this view, “do not do to others what you do not want for yourself,” 
“take as analogy what is near at hand” come to appear as maxims for life, 
while zhong acts as an essential condition, just like other cardinal virtues 
such as xin 信 (fidelity/truthfulness), xiao 孝 (filial love), di 弟 (brotherly 
love) and ci 慈 (love toward the young).  
The ruler earns the respect, loyalty and zeal of his people through kind-
ness, filial love, the promotion of worthy men (Lunyu II,20). In that sense, 
loyalty is not understood as a cardinal principle of Confucian ethics, but as 
the consequence of virtuous governance, exercised by a ruler who governs 
by virtue of his own moral strength and a correct application of the ancient 
ritual norms. The Confucian golden rule equates moral principles with hu-
man sensibility, appealing to a series of moral prescriptions (that may be 
identified with the li) that regulate life and guide man towards a sense of 
what is just. 
 
Empathy (shu) as the Way Towards Benevolence  
(…) The ability to take as analogy what is near at hand can simply be 
called the method of attaining benevolence.51 
The true gentleman daily displays benevolence towards others, and is al-
ways resolute in curbing his selfish impulses and unfailingly directed by the 
ancient ritual norms: 
Yan Hui asked what benevolence was. The Master said: “Through self-
discipline and by turning to the ancient ritual norms one attains benevo-
lence. If for one whole day man succeeded in disciplining himself by 
                                                                                                               
nevolence.” Sishu jizhu, p. 92; Daniel Gardner, Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects: 
Canon, Commentary and the Classical Tradition (New York 2003), p. 58.  
49  Lunyu XV,24.  
50  Nivison, “Golden Rule Arguments,” p. 75. 
51  Lunyu VI,30. 
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turning to the ancient ritual norms, the whole world would be led back to 
benevolence. Attaining benevolence depends on us, how could it depend 
on others?”52 
Benevolence stems from such natural dispositions as love and respect of 
one’s parents and older brothers, love of one’s children, which are feelings 
and attitudes that, when extended to others, reveal a deep sense of human 
understanding. 
The centrality of ren in the Analects and in Confucian ethics is demon-
strated by the large number of times it occurs.53 Benevolence, or humanity, 
is that virtue par excellence to which the gentleman tends, a state of mind 
that is indicative of generosity, unconditional love and devotion to the good 
of others. It is not easily attained, and indeed requires a constant exercise of 
the mind (si 思), study (xue 學) and overcoming the self (keji 克己). Man’s 
goal is to achieve benevolence, and this is a heavy burden!54  
It is by constant inner cultivation, supported by study, meditation, disci-
pline and religious observance of rules of social conduct inherited from an-
cient Sages that man is shown the authentic Way, the dao. It is not an abso-
lute gift nor a choice, but a rugged path that man naturally follows by means 
of gradual self-perfection, by pursuing moral integrity, fulfilling his duties 
to his family and society. And this rugged path leading to the dao is con-
structed by man himself as it is “man who glorifies the Way and not the 
                                                 
52  顏淵問仁。子曰:「克己復禮為仁。 一日克己復禮, 天下歸仁焉。為仁由己, 而由 
仁乎哉！」Lunyu XII,1. 
53  In the Analects, the term occurs 105 times; together with junzi (gentleman), which 
occurs 107 times, it is the most widely discussed issue in the work. However, in one 
of the most controversial passages in the Analects it is stated that seldom did the 
Master express himself on the subjects of profit, destiny and benevolence (Lunyu 
IX,1). Among the various interpretations of the passage, Anne Cheng suggests that 
the expression hanyan 罕言 refers to a type of communication similar to that ren-
dered by the expression weiyan 微言 ( parler subtilement), which does not indicate 
simply a discursive language but a type of communication made up of allusions, si-
lences, metaphors and gesturality, of which only the true Master is capable; A. 
Cheng, “Si s’était à refaire … ou: de la difficulté de traduire ce que Confucius n’as 
pas dit,” in Viviane Alleton – Michael Lackner (eds.), De l’un au multiple. Traduc-
tions du chinois vers les langues européennes (Paris 1999), pp. 205-217. See also 
Kwong-Loi Shun, “Ren 仁 and li 禮 in the Analects,” in Van Norden, Confucius and 
the Analects, pp. 53-72. 
54  士不可以不弘毅，任重而道遠。仁以為己任，不亦重乎？ [...] “Scholar-officials 
cannot but be strong and resolute, for they bear a heavy burden and their way is 
long. If they take benevolence as their burden, is it not a heavy one? [...]” Lunyu 
VIII,7.  
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Way that glorifies man.”55 However, he does not set off alone along this 
path; he is always accompanied by someone who provides the example he is 
to follow in his own conduct or the basis on which to correct it: 
 When you meet persons who are worthy, think to emulate them; when 
you meet persons who are unworthy, turn inward and examine your-
self.56 
Thus, it is in the relationship with the other that man’s thought and action 
are activated. The character ren 仁 is a perfect expression of the idea of re-
lating to the other with a loving attitude. The close relationship between ren 
and shu is indicated by Shuowen jiezi, in which shu is defined as ren.57 The 
Qing scholar Duan Yucai 段玉裁, precisely in connection with this, quotes 
the passage from the Analects “The ability to take as analogy what is near at 
hand can simply be called the method of attaining ren.”58 He also adds a 
passage from the Mengzi: 
Mengzi said: “The ten thousand things are all brought to completion by 
us. There is no greater joy for me than to find, on self-examination, that 
I am authentic. Strengthen your empathy and you will find that this is the 
shortest way to benevolence.”59 
According to Mengzi, benevolence cannot be too distant from shu, “not to 
do to others what you would not want for yourself,” a natural attitude that 
must be constantly cultivated and strengthened.60  
                                                 
55  人能弘道，非道弘人。Lunyu XV,29. 
56  子曰：「見賢思齊焉，見不賢而內自省也。」Lunyu IV,17.  
57  Duan Yucai, Shuowen jiezi zhu, ch. 10, p. 28.  
58  Lunyu VI,30.  
59  孟子曰:「萬物皆備於我也。反身而誠, 樂莫大焉。強恕而行, 求仁莫近焉。This 
passage is found in the chapter Jinxin 盡心 (“To give full realization to one’s heart-
and-mind”), Mengzi VIIA,4. Zhu Xi glosses cheng 誠 as shi 實 (reality, sincerity, 
authenticity, genuineness). Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, ch. 13, p. 350. Cf. D.C. 
Lau (transl.), Mencius (Hong Kong 1979, repr. 1984), p. 265; B.W. Van Norden 
(transl.) Mengzi, With Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Indianapolis – 
Cambridge 2008), p. 172. 
60  In another interpretation, the “golden rule” could stem from a personal interest, thus 
shedding its moral nature: “Do not do unto others what you would not want for 
yourself” would, in this sense, correspond to the assumption “If I treat the other de-
cently, the other will treat me decently”: do ut des, as suggested, for instance, by 
Confucius himself when he urges man not to impose on the others what he does not 
want for himself, “so as not to arouse resentment either in public or in private” 
(Lunyu XI,2). A loving disposition towards the others in this case would not be un-
conditional but has a definite aim: to safeguard the harmony of family and social re-
lations. Also Xunzi apparently adopts a utilitarian criterion when elaborating the 
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There is a passage in the Zhongyong that reiterates and expresses more 
clearly by means of a metaphor the idea that the source of benevolence and 
the quest for the Way are inherent in man himself: 
The Master said: “The Way is not far from man. If a person in following 
the Way distances himself from other men, it cannot be considered the 
Way. The Book of Odes says: “In hewing an axe handle, the pattern is 
not far away.” 61 We take hold of an axe handle in order to hew another 
axe handle. Yet if we look at them from far away, the two appear differ-
ent. Therefore the true gentleman starts from man (i.e., himself) to gov-
ern men and, when they are reformed, he stops.  
He who is loyal and empathetic is not far from the Way. What you don’t 
want done to yourself, do not do to others. 62 
What emerges from the quoted passage? Man’s dao stems from what is 
close to man, from man himself. It gives an analogical description of this 
model; although the model is not far away, there always remains a differ-
ence between it and what is used to model, to forge it. The new axe handle 
is derived from its archetype, but differs from it; the archetype takes part in 
the formation of man and, after forming him, is dissolved. Forming a man 
in relation to another is an act aimed at achieving harmony, not perfect iden-
tity.  
                                                                                                               
golden rule, when for instance he warns: “Remember that the others will treat us as 
we have treated them” (and in another case he declares: “He who does not give 
when he has possessions will not receive when he falls into poverty.” Wang Xian-
qian 王先謙, Xunzi jijie 荀子集解, Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書 (Shanghai 
1995), chap. 11, p. 148, chap. 30, p. 353. However, this is an interpretation, as H. 
Roetz emphasizes, that is relevant to the political and social sphere – as such, the 
urging is addressed mainly towards rulers and politicians. For further details on this 
interpretation see Roetz, Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age, pp. 143-148.  
61  The Ode, which appears in the Shijing, reads as follows: “In hewing [the wood for] 
an axe-handle, how do you proceed? Without [another] axe it cannot be done [...] In 
hewing an axe-handle, the pattern is not far off. [...]” James Legge, The Chinese 
Classics, vol. IV, The She King (London 1871, repr. Hong Kong 1960), Book XV, 
Ode VI, p. 240.  
62  子曰:「道不遠人。人之為道而遠人, 不可以為道。詩云:「伐柯伐柯, 其則不 
遠。」執柯以伐柯, 睨而視之, 猶以為遠。故君子以人治人, 改而止。忠恕違道 
不遠, 施諸己而不願, 亦勿施於人。 Zhongyong, in Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, p. 
23. My interpretation differs slightly from Daniel K. Gardner’s, The Four Books: 
The Basic Teachings of the Later Confucian Tradition, Translation, with Introduction 
and Commentary (Indianapolis 2007), pp. 116-117. A similar formula, 己所不欲，
勿施於人, occurs in Lunyu XV,24 as the explanation of shu. 
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Confucius defined the dialectical relation among men as an initiatic jour-
ney to be undertaken in company, in the direction of an inner growth bor-
rowed from the perception of the other, from interaction, from dialogue. 
The Master said: “If three of us were walking together I would certainly 
always have a master beside me: I would draw the good qualities of one 
to take example from, and the bad qualities of the other to correct my-
self. 63 
Moreover, the true gentleman helps the other in self-consolidation and in 
cultivating sensitivity towards what is just and appropriate, encouraging him 
to develop the good in him and not to develop what is bad.64 
Ren is a benevolent disposition towards others that is gradually cultivated 
and implemented through a process of inner discipline, by study, medita-
tion, the practice of the ancient ritual norms and the application of the golden 
rule. It is born of the love and respect for one’s parents, for one’s older 
brothers and for the family. Confucius claimed that love and the sense of 
duty towards one’s parents and older brothers was the basis of benevo-
lence.65 Affection and respect within the family are primary values for Con-
fucius, the foundations of a feeling that spreads outwards towards one’s fel-
low men. If an individual wishes to attain benevolence, he can do so at any 
time of his life as it is not too far away.66 
Therefore, according to Confucius, man has the potential capacity to de-
velop and achieve benevolence: those who seek it and then cultivate it, per-
fect it, and develop it through study, reflection and inner discipline, are able 
to attain it fully. It is born out of natural sentiments such as love for one’s 
family. Xu Shen, defined the term ren as qin 親, which expresses parental 
love, love within the family circle.67 Humanity, care of others, both stem 
from and are sustained by a natural sentiment, namely love for one’s parents 
and one’s brothers. Shu is a component of benevolence, but demands further 
commitment: to extend to others that loving disposition defined as qin, de-
siring for them what one wants for oneself. This is why the Master, when 
                                                 
63  子曰：「三人行，必有我師焉，擇其善者而從之，其不善者而改之。」Lunyu 
VII,22.  
64  子曰：「君子成人之美，不成人之惡。小人反是。」 The Master said: “A gentle-
man helps others to develop the good in them and not to develop the bad. A petty 
person does the opposite.” Lunyu XII,16. 
65  孝弟也者，其為仁之本與 [...] “As for filial and fraternal love, they constitute the 
root of benevolence [...]” Lunyu I,2. 
66  子曰:「仁遠乎哉? 我欲仁，斯仁至矣。The Master said: “Is human benevolence 
far off? You only need to want it and it arrives.” Lunyu VII,30. 
67  Duan Yucai, Shuowen jiezi zhu, pp. 365 and 409. 
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questioned about the definition of “he who works on behalf of others and 
succeeds in helping people,” answered “Why stop at ren? He is certainly a 
Sage!”68 
A loving disposition towards one’s family and one’s fellow men forms 
the basis of ren, the greatest Confucian virtue, above which there is only 
wisdom, a condition that only a few men – in the first instance, the ancient 
Sages – succeeded in attaining. Ren is the virtue that comprises all human 
virtues, namely, deference, loyalty, tolerance, sincerity, zeal, generosity 
and is constantly growing and evolving. It is thus not a static concept, but a 
dynamic one, as its achievement stems from and is nourished by a process 
of inner enrichment generated by a constant, reciprocal and changing rela-
tionship with others. There is thus an initial benevolence (love within the 
family) and a benevolence towards man in general, the achievement of 
which represents the fulfilment of all virtues. Love and the sense of family 
duty represent the foundations of a sentiment that, through the practice of 
shu, reaches out to the others, to one’s fellow man. 
                                                 
68  Lunyu VI,30. 
